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BUILDING DEMOCRACIES WITH SOUTHERN COMMAND'S
LEGAL ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY

America has conducted itself in the post-Cold War era with the understanding
that fostering democracies and encouraging military establishments subject to
the rule of law are vital to US national security interests.[ 1] In this regard, the
warfighting unified commands mirror the overall US national security policy of
peacetime engagement not only by maintaining close contacts with allies and
friendly governments for the purpose of imparting values and ideals associated
with democratic principles, but by focusing this commitment through detailed
engagement plans.
For example, in a document entitled "Strategy of Cooperative Regional
Peacetime Engagement," General Charles E. Wilhelm, Commander in Chief of US
Southern Command from 1997 to 2000 (now retired), set out his vision for Latin
America and the Caribbean as "a community of democratic, stable, and
prosperous nations ... served by professional, modernized, interoperable security
forces that embrace democratic principles, demonstrate respect for human
rights, are subordinate to civil authority, and are capable and supportive of
multilateral responses to challenges."[ 2]
In addition, recognizing that there is a legal dimension to almost every aspect of
the US Southern Command engagement plan, the Office of the Staff Judge
Advocate developed and published a first-ever legal engagement strategy in
[1998.3] The intent of the legal engagement strategy is to promote the concept
of professional law-based militaries that operate in accordance with the rule of
law, respect internationally recognized human rights[,4] and are subordinate to
and controlled by democratically elected civilian governments, in short, the US
Southern Command legal engagement strategy is a blueprint for democracybuilding in the context of the rule of law. In the quest for war avoidance, this
legal engagement plan is a unique force multiplier and contributes to the
"shaping" dimension of the National Military Strategy.
The Importance of the Rule of Law in War Avoidance
In his groundbreaking book about warfare in the 21st century, Race to the Swift,
Richard Simpkin argues that democracies must find "politico-legal devices" to
confront the enemies that threaten today's societies, and that the armed forces
of a democracy must carry out their duties in conformity with the rule of law.
Simpkin states, "Democratic governments rest on the rule of law, and must so
rest[.5]

The term "rule of law" was initially coined to refer to the common law system of
jurisprudence with particular emphasis on equality before the courts. The more
modern common meaning, however, encompasses those rules and legal
standards of behavior recognized and practiced between states in the context of
the community of nations, and connotes consistency in the application of
democratically passed and impartially implemented and enforced national laws
and regulations. In the words of University of Virginia law professor John Norton
Moore, the importance of the rule of law is central to international relations:
"Law ... is vitally important. Even in the short run, the [rule of] law serves as a
standard of appraisal for national actions and as a means of communicating
intentions to both friend and foe, and perceptions about lawfulness can
profoundly influence both national and international support for particular
actions."[ 6]
In tandem with Professor Moore's admonishment, the Clinton Administration's
Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, said that of all the problems facing the
Southern Hemisphere, none is more important than improving adherence to the
rule of law. "Where justice is absent," Albright writes, "peace and stability of a
nation and its neighbors come under threat; where justice is partial, citizens who
do not have access to equal treatment lose faith in their government, and the
forces of extremism grow strong; and where justice is unprofessional, crime
flourishes, corruption grows, and economies suffer."[ 7] If it is obvious that
justice cannot be achieved without adherence to the rule of law by all levels of
society, it is particularly true that a nation's military and security forces must also
embrace the rule of law.
Promoting the rule of law is not merely an end worthy unto itself; in the quest
for war avoidance and promoting the full range of human rights, there are great
benefits to both the United States and the world at large. In fact, recognizing a
nexus between the nation that mistreats its own citizens and the nation that
fosters aggression against its neighbors, both the preamble and Article 1 of the
UN Charter leave no doubt that justice, human rights, and the fundamental
freedoms of all mankind are at risk, and aggressive war an almost inevitable
outcome, when democratic principles and the rule of law are ignored.[ 8]
In other words, the fostering of democracies makes the world more secure
because, in the words of former national security advisor Anthony Lake,
"Democracies tend not to wage war on each other and they tend not to support
terrorism--in fact, they don't."[ 9] Indeed, it seems intuitively obvious that
activities pursued by democracies are substantially better than the activities
pursued by totalitarian or authoritarian regimes, which characteristically exhibit a
blatant disregard for the rule of law.

So, as many commentators have noted, the new paradigm for war avoidance
turns out to be a very straightforward model: If democracies make better
neighbors, it is certainly in the best interests of the United States to do all it can
to foster all emerging democracies and to thereby enlarge respect for the rule of
law in international relations. If democracies are better neighbors, the United
States must expend the necessary time, effort, and capital to effectively assist
those nations that have exhibited the political will to embark on democracy's
path. And nowhere has the desire for democracy and the rejection of repression
been more evident than in the amazing, and still ongoing, transformation of
governments in Latin America.
The Military in the Emerging Democracies of Latin America
Latin America's desire for democracy is seen in the remarkable transformation
that has taken place in the context of how people are governed. Just over ten
years ago some 90 percent of Latin American countries functioned under some
form of undemocratic military rule. Today, all but one of these countries operate
under popularly elected civilian governments. The Western Hemisphere is now
virtually all democratic, Cuba being the most obvious exception. Nevertheless, as
one would expect, a number of Latin American countries are experiencing
serious troubles in establishing or maintaining the institutions necessary for the
full blessings of democracy.
While assistance to the democracies in Latin America is needed at every possible
level, of utmost concern in the evolutionary transition from totalitarianism to
democracy is defining the appropriate role of the military forces there. In Latin
America, the militaries of the new democracies are often a decisive factor in who
governs. Unfortunately, the chief legacy of the undemocratic past is that those
militaries have a limited frame of reference for operating under principles
associated with the rule of law. On the contrary, coming out of a tradition in
which the ruling elite of the totalitarian state maintained power by using special
units of the armed forces as a primary instrument of repression against the
people, in many cases the military itself was viewed as the chief abuser of
human rights.[ 10]
Simply put, the totalitarian regimes relied on components of the military
establishment to maintain power and to suppress any threat--internal or
external--by any means. Human rights, the rule of law, and civilian control were
alien concepts. Thus, if the new democracies are to stabilize and flourish,
subordinating the military to civilian control befitting a democratic system in
which the soldier can carry out his mission in accordance with the principles of
human rights is absolutely essential. In short, a hallmark of a successful
democracy is the military's full acceptance of the fundamental principles of the
rule of law.

A law-based military is a key component of successful democratic reform. In a
democracy, the military cannot be an independent actor; it must take directions
from the government and be accountable to society for the way it carries out
those directions. The central question, then, is how best to help instill solid ruleof-law values in the armed forces. Since rule-of-law values become solid and
irreversible only through the development of institutions designed to promote
them, institutionalization must be the criterion. Teaching a few classes to a
military audience on US democratic traditions, for instance, is not a solution.
Rule-of-law values must be institutionalized through a systematic approach that
provides the necessary inculcation. Remarkably, the leaders of military and
security forces throughout the Latin American region have embraced--or at least
recognized and accepted--the need for civilian control of the government,
including the military, and in many cases, their efforts to promote military reform
have served as the catalyst for institutional changes in the nation's civilian
political institutions.
Legal Engagement Model
Promoting the rule of law in the new democracies involves questions and issues
which, because of their disparate nature, cannot be assigned to the jurisdiction
of any single agency or department of the US government. Still, because of the
nature of the problem--promoting the full range of rule-of-law issues to hostnation militaries--the matter is best spearheaded by the US military's uniformed
lawyers, its judge advocates.[ 11] Judge advocates serve as an action-based
resource capable of advising and responding to a variety of legal problems.
Traditionally, judge advocates are tasked to provide support to the US military in
the context of military justice, military administration, legal assistance, contracts,
procurement, international law, and law-of-war issues. In general, the principal
function of any judge advocate is to provide advice on legal matters to the
commander and his staff to ensure that all activities are carried out in
accordance with US domestic and international law.
The very existence of a uniformed legal corps serves as a way to institutionalize
the American commitment to the positive values of military proficiency and
ethical integrity in the armed forces. In addition, by doctrine, lawyers oversee all
of the regulatory requirements associated with providing training in the laws of
war[ 12] and code of conduct to all US soldiers.[ 13] As a result, few militaries in
history can match the record of the US military as it has functioned under the
rule of law, whether in the realm of respecting the law of armed conflict,
providing a fair system of justice for its soldiers, or operating under civilian
control.[ 14]
The Southern Command's lawyers faced a novel and formidable challenge in
crafting an effective legal strategy to support the unified commander's
engagement efforts while taking into account US operational and security

concerns, cultural diversity, mistrust of US intentions, resentment of US power
and influence, unfamiliarity with different legal systems that were oftentimes
dysfunctional and corrupt, and a natural resistance to change. Nevertheless,
after recognizing the key role a proactive rule-of-law program would play in
supporting Southern Command's theater engagement efforts, the Staff Judge
Advocate's Office conceived and crafted a coherent legal engagement strategy to
help build rule-of-law programs, effect necessary reforms within the military
justice systems of those countries interested in reform, and support military
reformers within the national ministries of defense in their efforts to
professionalize and legitimize their military and security forces. This legal
engagement strategy focuses on working cooperatively with nations in the
region, other government agencies, and international organizations[ 15] in order
to reinforce the importance of military institutions embracing the rule of law by
adhering to domestic laws and international legal standards of behavior.
The cornerstone of Southern Command's legal engagement strategy is an annual
symposium called the "Legal Symposium on Defense and Security Issues," held
annually in Miami, Florida. The symposium is an intensive four-day conference
that brings together the senior military leaders and their legal advisors from
throughout the region. The purpose of the symposium is to fully explore the
relationship that exists between commanders and their military legal advisors in
a democracy. Because effective legal reform requires the full support of the
senior leaders of the host nation, the symposium places special emphasis on
demonstrating to the senior foreign line officers the necessity of a law-based
professional military legal corps, and the importance of the rule of law in meeting
regional threats and challenges. This is accomplished through detailed lectures,
panel discussions, and working sessions devoted to real-world issues.
Throughout these exchanges, concrete examples are provided on how military
legal advisors can act as force multipliers over the full range of operational
issues.
As a by-product of the annual symposium, a number of defense ministries have
requested US assistance in defining how the law should properly function in their
military establishments and, further, how the military itself should fit into a more
democratic form of government that is serious about promoting human rights.
The Staff Judge Advocate's Office serves as a forward-based resource capable of
advising and responding to the variety of problems, sometimes enormous,
confronting many of the emerging and struggling democracies. This support
ranges from supplying basic information on how the US military adheres to the
rule of law, drafting codes of military justice, reforming antiquated military
justice systems, and assisting the foreign militaries in creating and training their
own professional legal corps.

Obviously, in a constrained resource environment, all the requests cannot be
pursued simultaneously. Therefore, consistent with the priorities established by
US Southern Command's Strategic Engagement Plan, the legal office focuses on
those areas and countries that have the highest priority for support. Priority is
determined by a number of factors, including the importance of the country to
US national security interests, a demonstrated willingness to effect reforms
within the military, and support from the civilian leadership. Furthermore, a
primary concern in the assessment process centers on how effectively, over the
long-term, a nation's military leadership can be encouraged to accept a reduced
and more professional role appropriate to a democracy and remain loyal to a
democratically elected civilian government.
A successful strategy to achieve this long-term goal must be based on two
overall themes directed toward the host military and appropriate government
officials: ( 1) foster greater respect for, and understanding of, the principle of
civilian control of the military; and ( 2) improve military justice systems and
procedures to comport with internationally recognized standards of human
rights.[ 16]
Two examples of US Southern Command's ongoing legal engagement efforts are
representative--one in Colombia and the other in Venezuela.
Colombian Human Rights Training
Recognizing that the militaries in many of the emerging and struggling
democracies have a slim frame of reference for properly handling human rights
issues, a major focus of the legal engagement strategy is to promote,
strengthen, and assist the host nation's armed forces in institutionalizing human
rights training. A representative and highly successful example of how the legal
engagement plan operates is seen in a recently completed two-year project to
fully institutionalize human rights training in the Colombian military. This longterm assistance effort stands as a model for other rule-of-law initiatives in other
regions.
One of the major obstacles in imparting concepts relating to human rights and
democratic principles is that many of the democracies in Latin America are
typically faced with the social and economic turmoil traditionally associated with
low-intensity-conflict environments, ranging from economic chaos to actual
armed insurgency. Thus, the effectiveness of any program of assistance must be
measured against the realities associated with the specific problems facing the
host nation.
Nowhere in the world do the multiple forces of insurgency, terrorism, and drugtrafficking threaten social order more than in Colombia. Foremost in the
Colombian fight for survival is maintaining the legitimacy of the military as it

conducts operations against a number of insurgency groups, foremost of which is
the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). A major step in solidifying
the legitimacy issue is to inculcate human rights and law-of-armed-conflict
training into the government's armed forces.
In October 1998, the then-Deputy Commander in Chief, US Southern Command,
Major General Alfred Valenzuela, directed the legal office to assist the Colombian
military in institutionalizing human rights and law-of-war training in the nation's
entire armed forces. General Valenzuela personally secured the support of the
Colombian Ministry of Defense to this end and was absolutely instrumental in
subsequently obtaining the necessary funding from the Secretary of the Army's
Latin American Cooperation Fund.[ 17]
While the Colombians expressed a desire to receive human rights instruction,
there was little, if any, standardized methodology to teach human rights to its
soldiers. There existed no military legal facility designed and equipped to train
Colombian commanders in these specialized legal areas. Clearly, Colombian
soldiers in the field had to be given adequate and meaningful human rights
training if they were to be held accountable and if they were expected to be
better prepared to cope with the abuses of terrorists. Furthermore, this training
had to be institutionalized into the fabric of the Colombian military system so
that human rights training would be a continuous requirement for all soldiers.
Cultural, language, and social barriers suggested the best chance for success
would be for Colombian instructors to deliver the actual subject-matter
presentations.
Ultimately, the legal office, working in conjunction with Southern Command's
Human Rights Division,[ 18] the International Committee of the Red Cross, and
Colombian human rights experts, developed and then executed a concept plan
that produced a human rights and law-of-war handbook to be used as the
standard training guide for the entire Colombian military. Over 500,000 copies of
the handbook were printed in Colombia, and a cadre of Colombian officers was
trained in two train-the-trainer courses on how to "teach the handbook." The
end state of this project is to have Colombian instructors train every soldier and
to institutionalize the handbook's contents as mandatory training for all future
soldiers.
The apparent success of this effort in Colombia must be tempered by the fact
that human rights training can be effective only to the degree that it is inculcated
into the psyche of the military. At a minimum, the Colombians now have a
standardized human rights training handbook that is truly their own. It is now up
to the Colombians to continue the effort. In this regard, the strategy to keep the
US role as that of a helper and not as an overseer has paid tremendous
dividends. If the Colombian military is successful in coming years, the success

will be due to their continuing commitment to teach human rights and the law of
war. Teaching and training, of course, must go hand-in-hand with investigating
abuses and holding the guilty accountable. As a by-product of this initial effort
and continued engagement with the Colombian senior military leadership, US
Southern Command is currently providing assistance in creating a new
Colombian military legal corps as well as instituting additional military justice
reforms. While much work remains to be done, one cannot help but be
cautiously optimistic that we have planted the seeds of a professional military
organization, free from corruption and accountable to its citizens.
Venezuelan Military Justice Reform
In Venezuela the focus was different. After the 1998 symposium, Venezuelan
military officials requested Southern Command's assistance in creating, as
mandated by new legislation, a completely new court-martial system with oral
advocacy as its centerpiece. Traditionally, criminal and civil justice systems in
Latin America have not used adversarial courtroom proceedings to render
judgments. Appointed judges act as prosecutor, defense attorney, judge, and
jury. Written testimonials are gathered, other documentary evidence is submitted
by the parties concerned, and the judge, with no imperative for expeditious
processing, eventually renders a decision. As a result, defendants often
languished for years in jail awaiting trial unless they could bribe their way out.
The decisionmaking process was usually secretive, and judges were never held
accountable for their judgments. Indeed, there was no way of determining how
judges arrived at their verdicts, and the system was obviously prone to
corrupting and illegitimate influences.
The Venezuelan justice system was typical of this endemic problem.
Consequently, the Venezuelan legislature passed a law requiring both civilian and
military courts to change to a system similar to the adversarial process used in
the United States. At a loss as to how to proceed, the Venezuelan Ministry of
Defense requested Southern Command's assistance. After several meetings and
visits to observe US trial procedures, a plan of action and milestones were
developed and approved by both sides.
Over a period of approximately ten months, US judge advocates, working closely
with their Venezuelan counterparts, drafted a new manual for courts-martial, set
up training programs for Venezuelan military lawyers, conceived and drafted
procedures for the conduct of trials, and arranged for visits to Puerto Rico to
observe adversarial trials as they were conducted in the Spanish language. As a
result of these intensive efforts, on 1 July 1999 the Venezuelan military
inaugurated the first-ever adversarial trial system in all of South America. Since
then, Southern Command has continued to make available various training
programs. For instance, Southern Command provided funding for a team of
experts from the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology to provide training on the

use of scientific test results and their introduction into evidence. Additionally, US
judge advocates have been provided as trial observers to offer follow-on advice
and assistance in the development of trial advocacy skills. Interestingly, the
civilian court counterpart to the military justice system, which was supposed to
have also converted to the adversarial system, has not yet, at this writing,
implemented the legislatively mandated reforms. However, civilian court officials
have started sending prosecutors and other attorneys to the military lawyer
training courses and are using the newly instituted military justice system and
procedures as the model for their reform efforts.
Southern Command subsequently has received a number of requests to support
comparable changes in military justice systems throughout the region. Similar
efforts are currently under way in Honduras and Guatemala, and plans are being
developed to support requests from Ecuador, the Dominican Republic, and
Bolivia.
Lessons Learned
The Colombian and Venezuelan initiatives serve as a blueprint for the Southern
Command's legal engagement plan. From these two cases, eight general points
are worthy of consideration.
• First, as demonstrated throughout the Colombian initiative, any program to
promote human rights values within foreign militaries must be built upon
institutionalizing those values into the fabric of that force. Obviously, this goal
can be achieved only through a systematic program designed to institutionalize
these concepts. In the past, the United States has not recognized the importance
of institutional reform. Instead, US programs relied on a variety of disjointed
military security assistance initiatives to try to instill human rights values
compatible with democratic principles in individual foreign soldiers. Since US
efforts were geared only at exposing the individual foreign soldier to human
rights ideals, institutional reform within the host-nation military never occurred.
Essentially, the promotion of human rights and democracy was an indirect,
hoped-for benefit at best rather than an explicit goal. Programs designed merely
to have US personnel teach human rights or the law of armed conflict on one or
more occasions will have only limited long-term results and will fail to instill pride
and responsibility into the host military, which comes from designing and
delivering their own human rights curricula for training.
This "train-the-trainers" approach is distinguishable from any other program in
that it assimilates the target country's military command structure at all stages of
the process in the development of a course to train its own soldiers in human
rights law. This approach promises success because the target military is more
likely to follow through with programs if its top military commanders have
invested the time and resources needed to develop them. There is a direct

positive correlation between the host nation viewing the program as an
indigenous effort and the amount of real support that is provided. The concept of
training the trainer places the cost and the reward where it belongs, with the
host country.
•

•

•

•

Second, formal requests for these types of long-term assistance must
always originate from the recipient government. Again, this is the purpose
of the annual legal symposium. In this way, the matter of assistance is
never framed as to what the United States is going to do, but what the
two nations can do together. In this manner, the host nation is engaged
in the reform effort at the beginning of the process. In Colombia, the idea
of developing some type of effective human rights training had been
percolating for several years. In Venezuela, the military leadership looks
to the United States and Southern Command as the best place to support
its mandated legal reform efforts. Furthermore, since the US
representatives in-country best know the local politics and personalities,
their complete support is essential. The lesson to apply in future efforts is
fundamental: only a unified US team working together with its host-nation
counterparts toward a common long-term objective will be able to launch
and sustain a successful program.
Third, closely related to developing solid requests for assistance from the
host nation is the task of getting a firm commitment for the end result,
real programmatic change. Since the task of institutional reform may
require a total restructuring of the current system, including the
elimination of programs that are counterproductive, the complete
cooperation of the senior leadership of the host nation is absolutely
essential. This commitment must be obtained as soon after the US site
survey assessment as possible.
Fourth, once the host nation has agreed to the concept of long-term
reform, it is important that the US working team not get too far out
ahead. Sensitivity is critical. Planners must take into account nationalistic
and other characteristics peculiar to each military in developing a reform
curriculum, whether in regard to military justice reform or human rights
and law-of-war training.
Fifth, one idea that needs further exploration is the concept of increased
regional military cooperation in rule-of-law reform initiatives. In the
project on human rights and law-of-war training, for example, the Staff
Judge Advocate's Office and the Human Rights Division of US Southern
Command are now working in Venezuela using the Colombian handbook
as a model. Further, at a subsequent conference in Caracas on military
justice reform attended by 15 countries, Southern Command proposed the
creation of an areawide, centrally located, JAG school. This school would
teach military and operational law to Spanish-speaking military lawyers
and would serve as the professional legal development school for the

•

•

•

region. While few countries have the resources to run their own schools,
they could instead contribute funds and other resources (for example,
instructors and supplies) to such a cooperative school, and the United
States could provide additional support and training to this one central
program for legal education. Ultimately, the proposed school also could
provide legal training to commanders and staff officers to sensitize them
to the legal issues associated with military operations.
Sixth, as in all relations with foreign nations, one needs to be particularly
sensitive to concerns from the opposite end of the domestic political
spectrum in the host nation. In this vein, the possibility exists that an
opposition group might seize on any US-assisted program as the opening
wedge to advance its own anti-US agenda. Efforts to make the list of
political participants and "organizers" as broad as possible are helpful in
defusing this potential problem. In Colombia, the US team brought into
the process as many civilian human rights groups as it could.
Seventh, a distinctive characteristic of a long-term program is the need to
stay engaged. Indeed, quality control requires that the US military
continue to monitor a program once it has been instituted. In this context,
measurable standards for positive advancement need to be developed.
This can be done by counting the number of soldiers trained and by
closely following the reports of human rights violations. It is essential that
contacts be maintained to allow the institutionalization to grow from the
roots. Planners for future efforts must understand that such initiatives are
not isolated events; tracking the program is just as critical as establishing
the program. Measures of effectiveness must be developed and constantly
analyzed to ensure that progress, however defined, is continually being
made in protecting human rights, ensuring a procedurally fair and efficient
military justice system, promoting the professional development of military
lawyers, and--this is critical--cultivating an understanding and appreciation
on the part of commanders and military leaders, civilian and uniformed, of
the importance of seeking legal advice before initiating military operations.
Finally, as we have seen with the Colombian initiative, it is crucial to
institutionalize and advocate the need for legal input in all phases of
military operations and training. In this regard, the legal office arranged to
have various Department of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
instructions and directives mandating legal reviews of all operation and
concept plans translated into Spanish and distributed at a recent legal
symposium. Further, the Staff Judge Advocate has personally provided
copies to senior civilian and military leaders in Colombia, Ecuador, Chile,
and Nicaragua, recommending that they be used as models for instituting
mandatory legal reviews to ensure compliance with domestic and
international law. Experience has demonstrated that it is only through topdown, mandated change that the natural resistance to such efforts will
eventually be overcome. Ultimately, without the full and willing

participation of the military leadership, these changes will have shallow
roots and be doomed to wither and fail.
Conclusion
In addressing the issue of promoting the rule of law in the militaries of Latin
America, the empirical studies that have conclusively demonstrated the
murderous behavior of totalitarian governments stand as a great motivator for
reform. As former University of Hawaii Professor R. J. Rummel stated: "The way
to end war and virtually eliminate 'democide' appears to be through restricting
and checking power. This means to foster democratic freedom."[ 19]
Through its legal engagement strategy, US Southern Command offers an
innovative but realistic program that can make a difference by providing the
lasting benefits of institutional democratic reform. By any standard of evaluation,
the two initiatives discussed here stand as valuable models for offering
meaningful help. For simplicity, focus, and potential for positive change, the legal
engagement strategy has no equal--it targets institutional change and strives to
ensure that the military forces of these new democracies are stake-holders and
equal partners, if not leaders, in building and sustaining democratic reforms.
If the United States is serious about promoting peace and human rights, it is
time to abandon mere showcase approaches to supporting the rule of law.
Rather, as Southern Command continues to demonstrate under the new
Commander in Chief, General Peter Pace, it is time for the United States to seek
great things, to roll up its sleeves and help enlarge the number of true
democracies in the world community. The blueprint for success exists. One need
look no further than Southern Command's legal engagement strategy and the
Strategy of Cooperative Regional Peacetime Engagement it supports.
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